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Remarks
ROBERT BMMINGHAM"
It is the style of a Soul that comes out in the world of num-
bers, and the world of numbers includes something more than
the science thereof.
- Oswald Spengler'
All of Professor Eastman's illuminating article
ing to heart Keynes' admonition
that in the long run we are all
dead,2 however, I address di-
rectly, among its many inviting
topics, only the Prisoner's Di-
lemma ('PD"). I display the PD
in the margin as Figure l. A
game is a PD if and only if A O,,ertjo
> B > C > D.
I separately quote and dis-
cuss three fragments from the
article, responding to each dif-
ferently! The first I criticize on
technical grounds. The second I
support and amplify. The third I
merits study. Tak-
Pcf.
;ure I
* Professor. UniversitY of Connecticut School of Law.
1. OSWALD SPEGLER, THE ,DECL E OF m WEST 58 (rev. ed. 1928).
2. JOHN M. KEYNS, A TRAcr ON MON,,ARY REFo,.O 88 (1920).
3. [Each reference to Professor Eastman's article will appear heme set off in an italicized
block quote. Ed]
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frantically wave a dead chicken over.4
It should be noted that in the case for the compelling logic of
the dominance principle, there is a central, politically and
morally-fraught assumption. The same ambiguity applies to the
dominance principle's decision theory counterpart, the expected
utility principle. If the conditions of a Dilemma story are suffi-
ciently restricted, dominance logic is compelling in the sense
that one will indeed do "better," by getting a higher payoff,
through following the dominance principle. Whether one should
conceptualize what one is doing in a particular situation in
terms of maximizing a payoff in a game, though, is an entirely
different question, as to which there is no formal, amoral logic
that applies. Game theorists try to fudge this problem by point-
ing out that the payoff one is trying to maximize may be under-
stood as including the welfare of others as well as oneself, so
that game theory need not be seen as presupposing narrow
egoism. But once the relevance of the relationship between
others'payoffs and one's own is admitted, the compelling force
of dominance logic as a basis for defection in the one-shot
Dilemma breaks down. One can simply decide that one does
not wish to take advantage of others, and cooperate.'
1. 1 simply propose a different window on the human predicament.
Consider: I write this lying on my futon in my office. It is October.
The leaves are turning. My office is in a gothic tower looking across to
a crimson maple. I am writing on a new Micron Millennia Transport
laptop with a 133-megahertz processor, a 12.1-inch screen, and
thirty-two megabytes of RAM. It and I are listening to the middle
movement of Mozart's clarinet concerto, K.#622, distinguished for its
appeal to computers, at least while they run neural nets.6
4. wave a dead chicken v. To perform a ritual in the direction of crashed
software or hardware that one believes to be futile but is nevertheless nec-
essary so that others are satisfied that an appropriate degree of effort has
been expended. "I'll wave a dead chicken over the source code, but I really
think we've run into an OS bug?'
THE NEW HACKEr'S DICnIONARY 445 (Eric S. Raymond comp., 2d ed. 1993).
5. Wayne Eastman, Telling Alternative Stories, Heterodox Versions of the Prisonerr' Dilem.
ma, the Coase Theorem, and Supply-emand Equilibrium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 727, 752-53
(1997). In quoting this passage, I have run along in the text a footnote of a single sentence
beginning "The same ambiguity.. . ," and omitted two other of Eastman's footnotes.
6. Cf RICHARD PoWms, GALATEA 2.2, 11-14, 235-36 (1995).
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So we are pretty comfortable. Intermittently, however, we read a
few pages of a new, unsettling book by Joseph B. McCormick and
Susan Fisher-Hoch. Its title is Level 4: Virus Hunters of the CDC.!
Many of the really awful viruses-Ebola, Lassa-are African. So the
authors live often in the bush, treating patients, hunting rats, etc. It gets
clear promptly that a hospital in Zaire, say, utterly lacks the amenities
of a law school in the West End of Hartford:
Mama Yemo is a sprawling institution. Its design is typical
of hospitals put up in the colonial era, with vast wards and
high tin-roofed ceilings that had begun to grow weak with rust.
Its cement floors were dark with the stains of countless miser-
ies. Air circulation was supplied by ancient overhead fans and
paneless windows. Each ward contained about thirty metal beds,
which were rarely empty. Mattresses were stuffed with cotton
or grass. Sheets were hard to come by. Meals for the patients
were provided by their families, and, with staff in short supply,
the families also assumed much of the responsibility for nursing
care. Bathrooms were scarce and rarely worked anyway, creat-
ing a rank odor that greeted you when you walked in and dog-
ged your every step until you lef. The wards were generally
choked with people afflicted with the most desperate illnesses.
There were jaundiced, bloated, cachectic, comatose, and vomit-
ing. Many had diarrhea. They arrived at Mama Yemo with
unhealed wounds, covered with crusts and pus, and emitting a
terrible stench. They came in endless droves. Screams and
moans echoed through the dank hallways. This is the face of
disease and death for the world's poor.
*. . The range of symptoms we saw in patients was stag-
gering. In a country as poor as Zaire, the sort of medical sup-
port a patient with AIDS might by rights expect is quite unaf-
fordable. These poor people suffered until their symptoms were
so extreme that they had to come to the public hospital. These
were the human tragedies we found before us. Some developed
such exquisitely sore mouths and tongues that they were unable
to eat. Those who could manage a few bites of food were
suddenly stricken by cramps and disgorged a copious amount of
diarrhea. Their skin would break out in massive, generalized
eruptions. Infected fungating masses would appear inside and
7. JOSEPH B. MCCORMICK & SUSAN FISHM-Hoc, L 4: VIRUS Hu4trEs OF Tm CDC (199.
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outside their bodies. When the infection didn't consist of vora-
cious yeast cells, there were many other parasites ready to eat
the brain alive. None of the victims could comprehend in any
way what was happening to them or why. And we? All we
could do was watch in horror, our roles as physicians reduced
to scrupulous observers and accurate recorders of documenta-
tion.'
What are the lessons here? One imagines that I am happier than
McCormick, much less his African patient. But strictly speaking such a
claim is not verifiable, makes no sense: are two As greater than three
Bs, sizes of As and Bs being indeterminate? It is methodologically
sound to repudiate interpersonal comparisons of utility. I do not think
that Eastman does this. Rather I think he futilely supposes that I am
selfishly having a good time, that McCormick is sacrificing his own
utility to help his patients or make the world a better place.
"love (lAy), n.," the OED defines: "That disposition or state of
feeling with regard to a person,... which manifests itself in solicitude
for the welfare of the object . . . ." The (partial) definition fits both
our hypotheses about McCormick.
In Admiralty class we are reading Sodomy and the Pirate Tradi-
tion," which chronicles many "instances of deepest devotion" between
pirates and cabin boys." Rounsivil, for example, was escaping from his
foundering ship. His companion shouted to him to come back. He
urged the other sailors in the small boat that was pulling away to turn
it about, but they refused. So Rounsivil 'jump'd into the Water, and
swam to the Vessel, and there perished with his Friend, since he could
not save him."'" What is going on here of course is that Rounsivil is
maximizing his utility in circumstances of limited opportunity. Suicide
occurs, and must occur, whenever the discounted sum of anticipated
happiness turns negative. Rounsivil is making his companion happy too,
although that is incidental. They love each other, their utility functions
being interdependent. More generally, pirate A loves pirate B if pirate
B's utility is an argument in pirate A's utility function. Of course the
8. Id. at 167, 173.
9. THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. on compact disc, version 1.10, 1992).
10. B.R. BURG, SODOMY AND THE PIRATE TRADITION: ENGLISH SEA ROVW~s IN THE
SE-CENTH-MuRY CARIBBEAN (1995).
11. Id. at 130.
12. Id. at 131.
(Vol. 29:827
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coefficient must be positive. 3 Practitioner's Note: In intimate contexts,
it ordinarily pays off in utility to suppress, or at most proclaim only
quietly and not insist on, these truths.
My point is that anything you do maximizes your utility (as you
perceive it), else you would do something else. The claim is only a
way to look at the world, being unfalsifiable. Clytemnestra, ostensibly
playing a PD, unexpectedly cooperates. The observing game theorist
would not easily concede to Eastman that she is not maximizing. Rath-
er, the game theorist would hypothesize that he had misspecified her
utility function, that he had constructed a PD where there is none. He
knows, however Clytemnestra behaves, she is maximizing some fimc-
tion (actually infinitely many). Let the fimction maximized specify her
utility.
So much for Eastman's misleading language, "One can simply
decide that one does not wish to take advantage of others, and cooper-
ate," insofar as it implies choice, or altruism in a stronger sense than
accidentally throwing off external economies. Back in the hospital in
Zaire, McCormick is deciding in a big way not to take advantage of
others (Eastman). Or he is a creature of his preferences, having no
more free will, or concomitant moral excellence, than a mousetrap 4 or
a turnip (me). McCormick saves Africans; I train lawyers. He is doing
good and I evil. I do not understand how Eastman can live with him-
self thinking that he could choose to be in Zaire not New Jersey but
not so choosing.
Now look at my Figure 1. Eastman and I read its payoffs antithet-
ically. For me they represent the players' total utilities; for Eastman,
only selected utilities. He calls "fudg[ing]" the idea that "the payoff
one is trying to maximize may be understood as including the welfare
of others as well as oneself" It includes the welfare of others only if
and insofar as one loves them. To do it my way is better because it
makes games determinate. From Figure 1, I can tell what its players
are going to do: defect. With the payoffs as he understands them, East-
man looking at Figure 1 has no idea what the players are going to do.
Illustration. Two ways to say the same thing. Eastman:
Clytemnestra "can simply decide that [she] does not wish to take ad-
vantage of others, and cooperate."'" Me: Clytemnestra loves Poncho.
13. MARSHALL JEVONS, A DEADLY IffMND CE 9 (1995).
14. Cf JoN HAUam.AND, ARTIFICIAL IuN LGEmCE: THE VERY IDEA 216-17 (1985).
15. Eastman, supra note 5, at 753.
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We can trace the effects in Figure 2. Its left side is the Prisoner's Di-
lemma of Figure 1, except that I replace the letters with numbers des-
PonCnho POnCho
c-.10 C.10oopr, oetoe~ de00f le ect
1 0 2 10€oe o oc .€OI QO1 QS Ie
I 0 2 o
t0 6 [ 01 12
0 6 0 12
Figure 2
ignating years imprisoned, the fewer the better. The left side of Figure
2 is as far as Eastman gets. That is, we cannot see anything from his
representation. Clytemnestra mysteriously cooperates despite numbers. I
have Clytemnestra playing a different game, that of the right side of
Figure 2, where Poncho loves her back, and each loves the other equal-
ly with herself. So each suffers the sum of the years in prison at each
outcome. I.e. if both players defect, each suffers 6 + 6 = 12 years; if
either cooperates while the other defects, each suffers 10 + 0 = 10
years. The changed equilibrium, which I emphasize one can read off
the representation, is that both players cooperate.
In Schelling's course I learned about the Prisoners' Dilemma. I
became a Prisoners' Dilemma enthusiast. It became a signifi-
cant part of my mental furniture, of the way in which I inter-
preted the world and situated myself in it.... I talked to my
parents about the Dilemma and its implications when I was
home on winter break; I had an argument with my roommate
about his leaving the lights on in which I invoked the Dilemma
.... Defining a believer as one who not only accepts but is in
some sense excited by or inspired by a particular understanding
of the world, I became a believer in the Dilemma.6
16. Eastman, supra note 5, at 735-36.
[Vol. 29:827
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2. The Prisoner's Dilemma does cause epiphanies. Compare Gauthier's,
described in Morals by Agreement:
The present inquiry began on a November afternoon in Los
Angeles when, fumbling for words in which to express the
peculiar relationship between morality and advantage, I was
shown the Prisoner's Dilemma. . . . Almost nineteen years
later, I reflect on a . . . voyage that is not, and cannot be,
completed, but that finds temporary harbour in this book."'
The reactions of Eastman and Gauthier differ interestingly. Eastman
grasps the PD at once and uses it. To a boy with a hammer, every-
thing looks like a nail. Gauthier studies the PD itself; tries to under-
stand it. Gauthier investigates what a hammer is. The difference resem-
bles that between applied and basic science.
Eastman believes the PD important or he would not be writing
about it. Let me speculate about how important it is. Evidently it is the
basis of contract.
Here is how. Think of contract law as the alternative to love in
solving the PD. Thus compare Figure 2 with Figure 3.
rGncho vo
CO COCOO O A-* 01 2 1 .1
S -2 I .
2
Figure 3
The payoffs now are dollars, Clytemnestra and Poncho wanting more of
them. They have contracted: to cooperate is to perform; to defect is to
breach. The left side of Figure 3 is again a PD. Expectation damages
change the game to that on the right side of Figure 3. Pretend that
Clytemnestra, defects, Poncho cooperates. She must pay him 3 (his 1 at
17. DAVID GAUTHm, MORALS BY AGREEmEar V (1986).
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the upper left outcome plus the 2 he loses at the lower left outcome).
Consequently at the lower left outcome the law leaves her with -1 (her
2 at the lower left outcome less the 3 she must pay Poncho.) Nobody
breaches, unless the payoffs are different, like (-2, 5) instead of (-2, 2),
indicating efficient breach.
Back to the hammer. Life is a big PD, that Hobbes says contract
solves:
If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature,
which is a condition of war of every man against every man,
upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a
common power set over them both, with right and force suffi-
cient to compel performance, it is not void. For he that
performeth first, has no assurance the other will perform after;
because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambi-
tion, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of
some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature,
where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their
own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he
which performeth first, does but betray himself to his enemy;
contrary to the right, he can never abandon, of defending his
life, and means of living.
But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to con-
strain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is
no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the cove-
nant is to perform first, is obliged to do so.18
As Eastman carefully explains, The PD is a counterexample to the
inference from 'Everyone maximizes her utility' to 'There is a Pareto
optimum'. From the social contract down to local interactions, law
treats it as an enthymeme, supplying the missing premise, 'There are
no (noninternalized) externalities'. 'All law resolves PDs' is like 'Every
event is caused'. True or not, it usefully guides practice. Finally note
the curious and beautiful symmetry between the PD and the Coase
theorem, which Eastman also features. Left alone to contract, the Coase
theorem says, parties often achieve Pareto optima. I think that the PD
and the Coase theorem partition the set of possible situations. Either we
18. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, in THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES 124 (1836).
[V/ol. 29:827
have a PD and the law fixes it. Or the Coase theorem applies and we
can work things out without (more) law. Eastman leaves this implicit
You want to see writing in law and economics done differently,
with less mathematical mumbo-jumbo, much less Chicago ideol-
ogy, and more emphasis on problems outside the narrow con-
text of pecuniary interest. You think that plenty of other people
would like it done differently, too (i.e., you and the others
could have welfare of 3 if you did it differently, compared to 1
if you keep on doing it the usual way). But there is a dilemma.
You don't want to go first (the one who does it alone gets 0,
while the one who sticks to the conventional way of telling
rational-choice stories gets 5). If only you could cooperate...
but here as ever, you may find yourself condemned to a worse
outcome than you could have had if you were not so wedded to
a narrow and counterproductive though apparently impeccably
logical view of rationality .... *
3. Yet we witnessed, in Part I, Eastman himself privileging the narrow
context of pecuniary interest; with the aspersion, "Game theorists try to
fudge ... by pointing out that the payoff one is trying to maximize
may be understood as including the welfare of others as well as one-
self." Including the welfare of others is love, the least pecuniary inter-
est. Eastman arbitrarily excludes it.
The big difference between us, though, is that I prefer more mathe-
matical mumbo jumbo. The OED defines: "mumbo jumbo . . . 1. A
grotesque idol said to have been worshipped by certain tribes or associ-
ations of Negroes... 2. transf. a. An object of unintelligent veneration.
b. Obscure or meaningless talk or writing; nonsense," as in "A
mumbo jumbo of meaningless words and phrases," from the London
Times of 1955.20
Eastman uses 'mathematics' loosely, meaning logic or formal repre-
sentation. I guess then that he is saying that we respect mathematics
too much, that we are stupid in respecting it, that mathematics is hard
to understand, and, perhaps, that it is nonsense. To counter these accu-
sations, I show, in A, how formality helps explain; and, in B, that story
19. Eastman, supra note 5, at 823.
20. THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcInOAtRY, supra note 9.
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telling, which Eastman would substitute for formality, can lead us far
from the truth. Finally C throws in case law, which at some remove
Eastman and I are writing about.
A. You are a contestant on "Let's Make a Deal." The big deal
(Nettles, Greg's chocolate lab, coveted by Allison) is behind curtains 1,
2, or 3. You are trying to choose that curtain. Tentatively you choose
perhaps 2. Monty Hall (M) knows which curtain Nettles is behind,
intends not to disclose her. He opens a curtain you did not choose,
perhaps 1. No Nettles. MH can always do this because at least 1 or 3
does not conceal her. He invites you to switch curtains. You think,
there are two curtains, Nettles is as probably behind either, it is a mat-
ter of indifference whether I switch. But this reasoning is incorrect.
Counterintuitively, you should switch, and choose 3.
Bayes' theorem explains why you should switch. I write a form of
it promoted by Salmon:2
P(T,/E) / P(T2/E) = (P(r,) * POEr,)) I (P" 2) * P(Eir 2))
The Tis are competing theories. In this instance, one or the other is
true. T,, the first theory, asserts Nettles is behind curtain 2. T2, the
second theory, asserts she is behind curtain I or curtain 3. E, the evi-
dence, is that MH! opens either curtain 1 or curtain 3 without finding
Nettles. Translate the 'I's inside the parentheses by 'given that'. The
others indicate division. The P(TI/E)s are posterior probabilities (posteri-
ors): probabilities that the theories are true taken after E, after MH
opens curtain 1. Hence the first posterior is the probability Nettles is
behind curtain 2, given that MH opens, for instance, curtain I, without
disclosing Nettles. P(TI/E) / P(T2/E), the left side of the equation, is
the ratio between the posteriors. We are calculating this ratio. The
P(T)s are prior probabilities (priors): probabilities that the theories are
true taken before E, before MH opens curtain 1. The P(E/T)s are like-
lihoods: probabilities of E, that ME opens curtain 1 or curtain 3 with-
out encountering Nettles, conditioned on one theory or the other being
true. In English, the equation states, 'The ratio of the posteriors of the
competing theories equals the prior of one multiplied (*) by its associ-
ated likelihood, divided by the prior of the other multiplied by its asso-
ciated likelihood'.
To calculate the ratio of the posteriors, the left side of the equation,
you must identify the two priors and two likelihoods on its right side.
21. Wesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivhiy in Science or Tom Kuhn Meets Tom
Bayes, in THE PIELOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 256 (David Papeneau ed., 1996).
[Vol. 29:827
Both priors and a likelihood are straightforward. Before E, the probabil-
ity is 1/3 that Nettles is behind any curtain. Accordingly P(T,) = 1/3
and P(T2) = 2/3. Also, the easy likelihood, P(E/T1), is 1: if Nettles is
behind curtain 2 as T1 asserts, the probability is 0 that she is behind
either curtain I or curtain 3. That leaves the difficult case, P(E/T). T2
asserts that Nettles is behind curtain 1 or curtain 3. Pretend MH does
not know which. Then P(E/T) = 1/2: Nettles is as likely behind the
curtain he opens as not. Now E: MH opens curtain 1, and Nettles is
not behind it. Then P(T,/E) / P(T/E) = (1/3 * I) / (2/3 * 1/2) = 1.
The right side of the equation is 1/3 divided by 1/3; the posteriors are
equal. Nettles being as probably behind curtain 2 as curtain 3, it does
not matter whether you switch. But MH knows where Nettles is and
does not open that curtain. Hence P(E/T) = 1. Then P(T1/E) I P(T/E)
= (1/3 * 1) / (2/3 * 1) = 1/2: Nettles is twice as probably behind cur-
tain 3 as behind curtain 2. You double your probability of winning her
if you switch.
B. Eastman wants less mathematics. He would substitute stories.
"Providing more and different stories should be the goal," he says.
My goal is fewer and identical stories. To support my preference, I
exhibit some horrible, independently entertaining results of uncon-
strained storytelling.
L The best story, being the least plausible, is that the ancient
Greeks misappropriated Egyptian culture. The story contravenes history
not mathematics, but is on point if lack of rigor is what counts. I let
Lelkowitz report:
Dr. Yosef A. A. ben-Jochannan was invited to give Well-
esley's Martin Luther King, Jr., memorial lecture. Posters de-
scribed Dr. ben-Jochannan as a "distinguished Egyptologist"
and indeed that is how he was introduced by the then president
of Wellesley College. But I knew from my research in
Afrocentric literature that he was not what scholars would ordi-
narily describe as an Egyptologist, that is, a scholar of Egyptian
language and civilization. Rather, he was an extreme
Afrocentrist, author of many books describing how Greek civili-
zation was stolen from Africa, how Aristotle robbed the library
of Alexandria, and how the true Jews are Africans like himself.
After Dr. ben-Jochannan made these same assertions once
again in his lecture, I asked him during the question period
22. Eastman, supra note 5, at 825.
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why he said that Aristotle had come to Egypt with Alexander
and had stolen his philosophy from the library at Alexandria,
when the library had only been built after his death. Dr.
ben-Jochannan was unable to answer the question, and said that
he resented the tone of the inquiry. Several students came up to
me after the lecture and accused me of racism, suggesting that I
had been brainwashed by white historians. But others stayed to
hear me out, and I assured Dr. ben-Jochannan that I simply
wanted to know what his evidence was: so far as I knew, and I
had studied the subject, Aristotle never went to Egypt, and
while the date of the library ... is not known precisely, it was
certainly built some years after the city was founded, which
was after both Aristotle's and Alexander's deaths.
• ..The trouble was that some of my colleagues seemed to
doubt that there was such a thing as historical evidence, or that
even if evidence existed, it did not matter much one way or the
other, at least in comparison with what they judged to be the
pressing cultural issues and social goals of our own time. When
I went to the then dean of the college to explain that there was
no factual evidence behind some Afrocentric claims about an-
cient history, she replied that each of us had a different but
equally valid view of history.23
2. The physicist Sokal perpetrated the best fraud, composing Trans-
gressing the Boundaries24 as a spoof, then submitting it to a leading
postmodem literary journal, Social Text, published by Duke University
Press. Stanley Fish, among other things a legal scholar, heads the Press.
Its editors published the article. I restrain myself to exhibiting two of
Sokal's satirical treasures.
i. Sokal uses adverbs like 'lucidly' effectively. "Unfortunately,
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has frequently been misinterpreted by
amateur philosophers,"' Sokal asserts. He continues,
As Gilles Deleuze and F1ix Guattari (1994, 129-30) lucidly
23. MARY LEKOWrZ, Nor Our oF AMCA HOW AFROCENnUIM BECAME AN EXCUSE TACH
MYTH AS IsTORY 2-3, 4 (1996).
24. Alan D. Sokal, Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of
Quantum Gravit, 14 SoC. TEXT 217 (1996).
25. Id. at 231-32 n.2 (quoting GILLES DmwUaZE & FwIX GUAITAR, WHAT is PHI OPHY? 129-30
(Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchell trans., 1994)).
[Vol. 29:827
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point out,
in quantum physics, Heisenberg's demon does not express
the impossibility of measuring both the speed and the
position of a particle on the grounds of a subjective inter-
ference of the measure with the measured, but it measures
exactly an objective state of affairs that leaves the respec-
tive position of tw6 of its particles outside of the field of
its actualization, the number of independent variables being
reduced and the values of the coordinates having the same
probability.... Perspectivism, or scientific relativism, is
never relative to a subject; it constitutes not a relativity of
truth but, on the contrary, a truth of the relative, that is to
say, of variables whose cases it orders according to the
values it extracts from them in its system of coordinates.26
ii. Sokal quotes Campbell and Campbell-Wright, campaigning for
feminist algebra, charging, "mathematics is portrayed as a woman
whose nature desires to be the conquered Other," 7 then adds,
Just as liberal feminists are frequently content with a mini-
mal agenda of legal and social equality for women and
"pro-choice," so liberal (and even some socialist) mathemati-
cians are often content to work within the hegemonic
Zermelo-Fraenkel framework (which, reflecting its
nineteenth-century liberal origins, already incorporates the axiom
of equality) supplemented only by the axiom of choice. But this
framework is grossly insufficient for a liberatory mathematics,
as was proven long ago by Cohen 1966.
The Axiom of Equality is 'Vx(x = x)', that is, 'For all x, x is
equal to itself. It is about self-identity, not social equality. A set is
more or less a collection. The Axiom of Choices asserts the existence
26. Id.
27. Mary Anne Campbell & Randall K. Campbell-Wright, Toward a Feminist Ag4ara, In
TEAaN TIE UkruY BRMm mo (Gzmt E=ER iN Scax4 hEMiAm Eswmm
127, 135 (Sue V. Rosser ed, 1995).
28. Sokal, supra note 24, at 242-43 n.54 (citing PAuL . COHEtI, SEr TNEORY AmD THE CONTIN-
uUM HypOmats (1966)).
29. QGREoRY K MORE, ZmL's AXIoM oF QOc: ITs Ocanas, DE oP.mr, Am NLu c
(1982).
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of a set that contains exactly one element from each set of any set of
sets. It is "probably the most interesting and, in spite of its late appear-
ance, the most discussed axiom of mathematics, second only to Euclid's
axiom of parallels which was introduced more than two thousand years
ago."'3 But it is unconnected to the abortion debate. The continuum is
the set of real numbers, that is, the set of sets of integers. The "press-
ing problem" of the size of the continuum is "the deepest that contem-
poraiy mathematics presents to the contemporary philosopher of mathe-
matics."'31 The presupposition is that infinities come in different sizes.
The of integers are R0. The continuum is 21. The second smallest in-
finity is n1. The Continuum Hypothesis asserts 210 = R1. The 1966 pa-
per by Cohen cited by Sokal completes the proof, begun by G6del, that
the axioms of set theory do not decide the Continuum Hypothesis.
Nothing social turns on this independence.
Sokal does not fake the quotations. Deleuze and Guttari, Campbell
and Campbell-Wright, write what he accuses them of writing. Sokal's
own text is intentionally mumbo jumbo in a bunch of the defined sens-
es. But it blends into Social Text. That it lacks salience there casts
doubt on the other contents of the journal. Think of a clock striking: a
thirteenth stroke makes suspect the first twelve.
3. Imagine McCormick maximizing his utility in Zaire. Rats carry
Lassa fever. McCormick is in the field counting and killing them.
Meanwhile, in Animals and Women, something of an antithesis to a
public health manual, Dunayer confides, "Over the years, seventeen rats
have been my adopted friends. All were highly sensitive .... ."" She
concludes, "Humans' gross misunderstanding and relentless persecution
of rats causes me particularly sharp anger and grief."'33
Animals and Women,34 a book of essays also published by Duke
University Press, seems, like the rats, to be a vector of disease. The
collective argument of these essays is that, both women and animals
having been oppressed, and women having won partial independence,
they must help liberate animals.
Chickens get equal time with rats:
30. ABRAwM A. FRAEmL & YEHOsHUA BAR-HILLEL, FOUNDATIONS OF Ssr THEORy 47 (1958).
31. Penelope Maddy, Believing the Axioms (p. 1), 53 J. SYMBOLIC LoGic 481, 482 (1988).
32. Joan Dunayer, Sexist Words, Speciesist Roots, in ANIMALS AND WOMEN: FEMINIsT THEO-
RETICAL EXPLORATIONS 11, 25 n.13 (Carol J. Adams & Josephine Donovan eds., 1995) (hereinafter
ANIMALS Am WOMN).
33. Id.
34. See David Sexton, Men Are Beasts!, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1996, at A9.
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Viva was not only strong-willed and alert; she was expressive
and responsive. One of the most touching things about her was
her voice. She would always talk to me with her frail "peep"
which never got any louder and seemed to come from some-
where in the center of her body which pulsed her tail at pre-
cisely the same time. Also, rarely, she gave a little trill. Often
after one of her ordeals, in which her legs would get caught in
her wings, causing her terrible confusion and distress, I would
sit talking to her, stroking her beautiful back and her feet that
were so soft between the toes and on the bottoms, and she
would carry on the dialogue with me, her tail feathers twitching
in a kind of unison with each of her utterances?5
C. Eastman explains the case law better than I, although it is a
close thing. The heavy ideological content of the PD for Eastman is
absent from the cases. His theories of utility and decision predict opin-
ions better than mine. Judges, especially Easterbrook, can benefit from
his lucid explanation of the PD.
The PD appears increasingly often in case law: not at all before
1978, thirteen times by late 1996. In Figure 4, I exhibit the temporal
distribution of
the appearanc-
es of the PD
and their qua- 3
dratic 2.5
least-squares 2
fit. Extrapolat- 2134d54 O0W34M3ez
ing, by 2030 Cases 1.5
ten cases annu- I .
ally will men-
tion the PD. 0.
Suppose the 980 198 M 1995
number of Years
cases decided
each year Figure 4
doubles every
35. Karmn Davis, Thinking Like a Chicken: Farm Animals and the Feminine Connection, in
ANIMALS AND WOMN, supra note 27, at 192, 194-95.
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fifty years. Then every case will mention the PD by 300000. This year
being a long way off, circumstances may have changed.
Of the thirteen cases, I look mostly at two by Judge Easterbrook,
for two reasons; Easterbrook is articulate, and screws up. The articu-
lateness first. "The couple, separated by the agents, then played and
lost a Prisoner's Dilemma game. See Page v. United States, 884 F.2d
300 (7th Cir. 1989)," Easterbrook says in United States v. Herrera.3 6
He does not describe the game, apparently assuming his readers know
it. The case that Easterbrook cites, Page, does describe it, as we will
see. Having decided Page too, he cites his own earlier description. The
issue in Herrera is whether a sentence of fifteen years for drug offens-
es and assault is excessive. Easterbrook, calling it "lenient," '37 decides
not.
The couple who play and lose the PD are Geraldo and his wife
Cynthia. Dissatisfied with her play, Geraldo "clobbered the back of her
head with a hammer."'38 This sort of domestic dispute does not depend
on the PD. Geraldo might have assaulted Cynthia for bidding two
hearts or burning the broccoli.
No case explicitly decides the PD is legal. United States v. Mad-
dox assumes legality, however, saying, "versions of the 'Prisoners'
Dilemma' during plea negotiations are rather commonplace because
they are effective and courts have held that they are constitutional." '
For authority, Maddox cites only Page, using the introductory signal,
'See, e.g.,' which instills no confidence.
Page is not great authority for the legality of the PD. Page had
complained that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing
that his trial counsel was ineffective. The alleged original ineffective-
ness lay in not getting Page out of the PD. Easterbrook decides the
case on the procedural ground that Page waived his objection by rais-
ing it too late. The closest Page comes to holding the PD legal is not
holding it illegal, when offered the opportunity to do so.
Easterbrook, in Page in 1989, starts out trying to state the PD:
Students of strategy and bargaining cut their teeth on the game
of Prisoners' Dilemma. Two prisoners, unable to confer with
one another, must decide whether to take the prosecutor's offer:
36. 70 F.3d 444, 445 (7th Cir. 1995).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 48 F.3d 791, 796 (4th Cir. 1995).
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confess, inculpate the other, and serve a year in jail, or keep
silent and serve five years. If the prisoners could make a (bind-
ing) bargain with each other, they would keep silent and both
would go free. But they can't communicate, and each fears that
the other will talk. So both confess. Studying Prisoners' Dilem-
ma has led to many insights about strategic interactions. See
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 53-80, 119-61
(1960; 1980 rev.).!'
I find it interesting that Easterbrook, like Eastman, cites Schelling's
easy, anecdotal, compelling book.
The case for illegality, while lost, is not insubstantial. The PD
looks unconstitutional from my perspective. The Seventh Amendment
likes confessions to be voluntary. I do not find anything voluntary
about the PD. The prosecutor chooses whether the prisoners play it. If
they play it they lose, that is, they confess. Thus their confessions look
involuntary. In Eastman's PD, a player chooses to confess or not.
Hence Eastman lacks my problem about constitutionality. Easterbrook
lacks it too, so Eastman's theory explains Easterbrook's decisions better
than mine does.
Admissibility is a bigger problem. Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires, for evidence to be admissible, that it be relevant.
Rule 401 has just defined relevance as "any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."41 Confessions obtained through the PD lacks this tendency.
Nearly canonical descriptions of the PD often begin, "Two people have
robbed a bank and are apprehended by the police ..... But the PD is
independent of the guilt of its players, innocent prisoners, by its logic,
confessing as readily as guilty prisoners.
Recall Bayes' theorem,
P(T'r/1 ) / P(rE) = (P(r,) * P(EIr,)) / (P0r2) * P(EWI)),
this time with T, being that the prisoners are innocent, T2 that they are
guilty, E that they confess. But everyone, guilty or innocent, confesses;
consequently
P(Etr) = PtFqr2) = 1, PChr/E) / POCr) = P(TI) / (P(T2).
40. Page v. United Stales, 884 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1989).
41. FED. R. EvaD. 401.
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The posteriors are the same as the priors. The evidence that the pris-
oners confess, changing no probability, is irrelevant under Rule 401.
What is engaging about Page, though, is that Easterbrook, a really
smart, learned judge, misstates the PD. He is not even close. First, the
players may communicate, as long as they cannot contract. Second,
Easterbrook gets the numbers wrong.
Figure 5 is Figure 1 with Easterbrook's sentences superimposed. It
is somewhat hard to figure out what these sentences are but here goes.
Easterbrook says the players go
free if neither defects: hence the
Os in the upper left. He says, I Po
think, that defecting while the coopeate defect
other cooperates gives 1. Finally, 0
if a player defects, the other gets c**pwo.
5, whatever she does. I may 0 5
misstate what Easterbrook in- clyt,,ofSt
tends; but any other interpreta- dec,
tion takes us still farther from I S
the PD.
So here is what is wrong. In Figure 5
Easterbrook's game, nobody
defects. The only difference in a
player's payoffs occurs if the other player cooperates. Then the first
player gets 0 for cooperating, I for defecting. These are years in jail
and neither player wants them. Of course, in the real PD, everybody
defects.
"[E]ach fears that the other will talk," Easterbrook says.4" He ex-
plains defection by this fear, has a player reason, 'The other player
might defect, hence I had better defect too'. This reasoning is right for
the game of Figure 5, inapposite in the true PD. In the true PD a play-
er cares whether the other player defects, in the sense that her utility
depends on it. So she fears, in this noninstrumental sense of 'fears',
that this other player will defect. This fear cannot explain her behavior
because she defects with or without it.
By changing the payoffs from cooperating if the other player de-
fects, call them 'D', I can fix Easterbrook's game so that what one
player does matters to the decision of the other. The expected payoff
from defecting is 1 (1 - p) + 5 p, p being the probability the other
42. Page, 884 F.2d at 301.
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player defects; from cooperating, 0 (1 - p) + D p. Let D equal 6, in-
stead of 5, as in Figure 5. Now a player cooperates if p < 0.5, defects
if p > 0.5, does either indifferently if p = 0.5. For D = 6, p = 0.5, the
expected loss is 3 years for cooperating or defecting.
But again, this is not Easterbrook's game. Neither is it the PD. So
Easterbrook does not know what he is talking about. He should study
Eastman's article to find this out. So should we all for deeper under-
standing of this game.
APPENDIX: How I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE BAYE's
THEOREM
JOHN J. BRUDZ"
Professor Birmingham's exposition of the Monty Hall problem is clear
and correct to a level of precision foreign to the legal profession.
Following the sound principle that nothing worth knowing should be
clearly and unambigously expressed, I will attempt to undo some of the
damage by cluttering Baye's Theorem with a little unconstrained story-
telling.
A brief recap of the problem: There are three doors, there is a
prize behind one door, and nothing behind the other two. You choose
a door, Monty Hall, who knows which door the prize is behind, shows
you what is behind one of the doors you did not pick. It is empty.
He then asks you whether you want to switch doors. You have read
Professor Birmingham's article, so you know that according to some
odd looking equations you should switch, but you can't seem to shake
the feeling that something to the left of voodoo is pushing you to
* [ed. John J. Brudz is a student at the University of Connecticut School of Law. Pro-
fessor Birmingham asked Mr. Brudz to allow his explanation of the Monty Hall problem to
be an appendix to Professor Biningham's article because Mr. Bnzdtz does a good Job of i1]
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switch, while good old horse sense clearly tells you that there can be
nothing to gain by switching. You decide to stay, and two times out
of three you lose. Why?
Door I Door 2 Door 3
Outcome I X 0 0
Outcome 2 0 X 0
Outcome 3 0 O X
Figure 1: Three possible outcomes
There are three possible distributions of the prize, it is either
behind door 1, 2, or three. If X is the prize and 0 is, well, self
explanatory, the three possible outcomes can be described as seen
in Figure 1.
Outcome Y
Outcome 2
Outcome 3
Figure 2: You choose door
Door 2 Door 3
0 0
X 0
o X
Each outcome represents a possible state of the world. You are either
in outcome 1, 2 or 3. You can see that there are three X's in the
diagram out of a total of nine spaces, showing what you know intu-
itively to be true, that an initial random choice will give you a 1/3
chance of winning.
You choose door number 1. You can see by the diagram that
there is one chance for a prize (X) and two zonkers (O's) confirming
once again your suspicion that you have a 1/3 chance of winning. At
this point you can see that any door has the same probabilities as your
door.
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At this point Monty Hall opens a door and shows you a non-prize
(a goat or perhaps a political pundit). You know that he will not pick
a door with a prize, so there are only certain possibilities for him.
There is only one door he can pick in the two outcomes where you do
not already have the prize, and in the world where you do have the
prize he has two choices, but it really doesn't matter which.
......... Door 2 Door 3
Outcome 1 0
Outcome3 2
Figure 3: Monty shows you a pundit
Monty Hall asks you if you want to switch. This is the point at
which horse sense is correct, you now have a choice between two
doors, the one you have and the other one, but common sense leads
you astray when it tells you that there is an even chance between hav-
ing the prize behind you door and the other one.
Othier Door
Outcome I
Outcome 2
Outcome 3 x
Figure 4: The crux of the biscuit
Figure 4 depicts the game now that the door Monty has showed
you is out of play. There are now two chances to win behind the
other door, and only one behind the door you already hold. There is a
2/3 chance that you will win if you switch and a 1/3 chance that you
will win if you stay.
The key to this problem is to understand that Monty Hall is telling
you more than you think he is. When you know that he will pick a
door that does not have the prize, you know his choice will tell you
1997]
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something, and in this case the information he gives you is enough to
change your decision.
The Monty Hall problem shows an instance where the common
sense weighing of evidence results in an erroneous decision. Short of
jury instructions expositing Baye's Theorem, legal professionals need to
be able to understand how to correctly analyze probabilities, and be
able to explain to judges and juries exactly how evidence should be
weighed.
